The Art of Battle: Animated Battle Maps

Battle of Fornovo, 1495

Jonathan Webb — Fri, 27 Jan 2012 04:49:15 +0000

Francesca II Gonzaga versus Charles VIII: A League army under Gonzaga seeks to destroy a French army marching home under Charles, but the Taro River separates them. Will Gonzaga’s audacious attack plan overcome not only the terrain but one of the most reputable armies in all of Europe?

This battle is classified as a draw and had little eventual consequence but did create a situation in which decisive results and consequences were possible. In a strategic sense, the French were able to achieve their objective of continuing on to France as a result of their tactical victory over League forces on every front. However, League cavalry was able to loot the French baggage train, claiming 180,000 gold ducats as well as forcing most French soldiers to go without tents, dry clothes and food for the night (Nicolle, 1996: 73). Aside from sowing tensions among the League commanders, the League army may have been in a better state compared to the French after the battle, suffering proportionately fewer casualties and possessing more fresh soldiers. Of course, neither army followed up the battle with any bold action, and thus the battle is remembered as an indecisive draw.

Gonzaga’s plan of attack appeared faultless but obviously had significant problems. Contradictorily, the League’s goal was the enemy’s total destruction and yet over a quarter of its soldiers guarded the camp. Taylor explains that the battle is notable for the “bad choice of ground by the [League], and for the over-elaboration of their tactical scheme. Lack of determination prevented tem from driving their attacks home or from making use of their reserves, while indiscipline ruined the most promising feature of the plan – the diversion of the [light cavalry]” (1973: 115). The League plan correctly identified the French center and Charles as the most promising target and allotted 10,000 men in the battlegroups of Gonzaga, Garlino, Fortebraccio and Montefeltro to defeat the 3,900 men of the French center and rearguard. However, the above factors eroded the mass and energy of the main thrust: “Thus, at the moment of confrontation, Gonzaga and Fortebraccio were left without support, and the French probably outnumbered them” (Santosuosso, 1994: 242).

Following the failure of the League plan, League commanders showed some initiative in securing the fords Gonzaga and Fortebraccio’s battlegroups used to retreat as well as firing off artillery to deter any French counterattack.

Numbers for this battle are drawn from Santosuosso who describes the composition of each army’s many moving parts in detail (1994: 228-232). Nicolle’s Osprey edition was extremely helpful with the battle’s events, with only a few difficult reconciliations between the two sources. However, Nicolle appears to have forgotten to multiply the number of French lances, which denote units of six, not individuals, and as such Santosuosso is favoured in this regard. I did however add the 1,000 low-quality infantry to the French baggage train that Nicolle mentions (1996: 53) but Santosuosso omits.

- Jonathan Webb

Works Consulted

Dupuy, Trevor N. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 BC to the Present, Fourth Edition. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.

Nicolle, David. Fornovo 1495: France’s Bloody Fighting Retreat. Oxford: Osprey, 1994.

Santosuosso, Antonio. “Anatomy of Defeat: The Battle of Fornovo in 1495. International History Review 16.2 (1994): 221-250.

Taylor, Frederick Lewis. The Art of War in Italy 1494-1529. Westport: Greenwood, 1973.

Images

Charles VIII: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_VIII_of_France

Francesca II Gonzaga: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francesco_II_Gonzaga

French artillerymen: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_178_figure_1.htm

French infantry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_161b_figure_1.htm

French light cavalry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_169_figure_1.htm

French men-at-arms: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_178_figure_1.htm

Italian artillerymen: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_178_figure_1.htm

Italian infantry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_169_figure_1.htm

Italian light cavalry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_169_figure_1.htm

Italian men-at-arms: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_169_figure_1.htm

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Liberation of Paris, 1944

Jonathan Webb — Fri, 13 Jan 2012 21:52:59 +0000

By Michael Elkins

Click here to view animation.

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Battle of Pydna, 168 BC

Jonathan Webb — Tue, 27 Dec 2011 18:46:13 +0000

Lucius Aemilius Paullus versus Perseus: The professional legionnaires of a Roman army directly confront the stiff phalanx of a Macedonian army. Which infantry will reign supreme in this battle and the ancient era? Click on images below to view PowerPoint presentation. | Legend |

This battle marked the final contest between the legion and phalanx. The legion’s victory helped Rome become the dominant power in the Near East and control the Mediterranean Sea. By defeating Macedon, Rome also gained access to the knowledge and culture of Greece, which Romans benefited from “more than they could ever know” (Davis, 1999: 55).

Tactically, the decisive factor in this battle was the legion’s superiority over the phalanx though Fuller points out that Perseus made a mistake when he did not simply reform the disrupted phalanx under cover of lighter troops before continuing its advance (1954: 166). Inherently though, the legion was less susceptible to losing cohesion through friction in terms of anticipated and unanticipated developments during battle. The Roman legions were better organized to respond to events of a battle, such as breaking down into smaller units to infiltrate gaps in the enemy line. By exploiting these gaps and advancing along the axis of least resistance, the Roman legionnaires were able to cut through the phalanx from within. Despite his victory, even years later Paullus spoke of the terror of confronting the phalanx (Montagu, 2006: 225).

The Roman use of war elephants was also a supporting factor in victory, ironic given the fact that Greek armies typically used war elephants against the Romans, as Pyrrhus utilized effectively in 280 BC. For any observers of military history, it always comes as a surprise when war elephants do not prove more harm than good to the side employing them. This is obviously not always the case and Scullard proposes that by deploying only small numbers of war elephants, the Romans were able to train them more extensively and maintain control (1974: 184).

The timeline of this animation is somewhat deceiving. The Roman war elephants routed the Macedonian left wing in the beginning of the battle but this event is only depicted during the fourth animation sequence. My explanation is that a whirlwind of events occurred during this short hour-long battle and the duel between legion and phalanx required proper detail.

I had intended this animation to serve as an experiment for a somewhat new format which incorporated game footage from the Total War gaming series. The battle was chosen because it featured very visual events that the game engine could easily replicate, such as an elephant charge, phalanx becoming disordered etc. Unfortunately, this experiment would be no more than a tease and would mean a significant increase in time and coordination in the production of animations, a process that has become increasingly lengthier as I seek to improve accuracy and detail through more extensive research.

- Jonathan Webb

Works Consulted

Davis, Paul K. 100 Decisive Battles from Ancient Times to the Present. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Dougherty, Martin J. “Pydna, 168 BC.” In Battles of the Ancient World 1300 BC – AD 451, 120-129.London: Amber, 2007.

Fuller, J.F.C. The A Military History of the Western World Vol. 1. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1954.

Hammond, N.G.L. and F.W. Walbank. A History of Macedonia Vol. 3. Oxford: Clarendon, 1988.

Matyszak, Philip. Roman Conquests: Macedon and Greece. Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2009.

Montagu, John Drogo. Greek and Roman Warfare: Battles, Tactics and Trickery. London: Greenhill, 2006.

Scullard, H.H. The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World. London: Thames & Hudson, 1974.

Images

Lucius Aemilius Paullus: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucius_Aemilius_Paullus_Macedonicus

Macedonian cavalry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_49_figure_1.htm

Macedonian other infantry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_49_figure_1.htm

Macedonian phalanx: http://scottthong.wordpress.com/2007/05/21/the-macedonian-phalanx/

Perseus: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perseus_of_Macedon

Roman cavalry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_46b_figure_1.htm

Roman legionnaires: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_46b_figure_1.htm

Roman other infantry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_47_figure_1.htm

Roman war elephant: http://www.coolminiornot.com/213290

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Battle of Saratoga, 1777

Jonathan Webb — Sun, 18 Sep 2011 23:19:42 +0000

John Burgoyne versus Horatio Gates and Benedict Arnold: A British army under Burgoyne tries to reconnoiter the lines of an American army under Gates but Arnold, lacking a command, will not allow the British an easy time of it. How far can the Americans push the attack against the outnumbered British? Also known as the Battle of Bemis Heights. Click on images below to view PowerPoint presentation. | Legend |

This battle is often considered the decisive battle of the American Revolutionary War; the surrender of Burgoyne “removed a significant British force from combat [and] thwarted the British plan to divide the colonies. That was the best plan the British had during the war, but after Burgoyne’s failure it was rarely pursued” (Davis, 1999: 257). Its objective military effect is incomparable to the subjective political impact; the American victory convinced France that they could defeat Britain on conventional terms, prompting France to declare war on Britain. French military and economic support was a definitive factor in the eventual American victory. In this case, the perception of the victory was more important than the real impact.

Fuller harshly criticizes Burgoyne’s plan, calling his reconnaissance in force with 1,500 men “the blind throw of a gambler” (1954: 303). Howe’s plan to turn the American flank with 4,000 men does not seem any better but would at least be proportionately desperate to their situation. In the American camp, Gates only sent his troops into battle but never actually managed their actions thereafter. Arnold, in a sort of drunken, mythical rage, led the American units forward, somehow being “everywhere when needed” (Ketchum, 1997: 404). The victory on October 7 could have been more immediately decisive had Arnold not been wounded, leaving a vacuum of command which Gates did not fill.

I decided to animate this battle to make up for the absence of American content on the site. I hope one of the most decisive battles in American military history has the desired effect.

It may seem somewhat odd that I included Benedict Arnold as a commander. Although he did not hold any official command, he was the most influential personality on the battlefield, personally leading the American attack at its most urgent times.

- Jonathan Webb

Works Consulted

Ferling, John. E. Almost a miracle: the American victory in the War of Independence. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Fuller, J.F.C. The Decisive Battles of the Western World Vol. 2. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1956.

Furneaux, Rupert. Saratoga: The Decisive Battle. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971.

Ketchum, Richard M. Saratoga: Turning Point of America’s Revolutionary War. New York: Henry Holt, 1997.

Morrissey, Brendan. Saratoga 1777: Turning Point of a Revolution. Oxford: Osprey, 2000.

Images

American soldiers: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Infantry,_Continental_Army,_1779-1783.jpg

Benedict Arnold: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benedict_Arnold

British soldiers: http://www3.towerhobbies.com/cgi-bin/WTI0001P?I=LXYE41&P=8

Horatio Gates: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:HoratioGatesByJamesPeale.jpg

John Burgoyne: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Burgoyne

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Battle of Panipat, 1526

Jonathan Webb — Sun, 07 Aug 2011 18:23:37 +0000

Babur versus Ibrahim Lodi: An Afghan army under Ibrahim attacks a Mughal army under Babur, which is protected by a line of wagons and two safe flanks. Babur has something Ibrahim does not, namely cannons, but they are just a taste of the Mughal firepower; will Babur’s firepower be enough to defeat Ibrahim? Click on images below to view PowerPoint presentation. | Legend |

Babur’s victory laid the foundations of an empire that would eventually unite most of India. This battle should be significant to Western historians because it makes it abundantly clear that India had a rich culture and military history before any European arrived, that history does not begin when Europeans arrive to record a story.

The use of wagons in battle is always intriguing especially when used successfully. Babur used his wagons offensively, not defensively: “Men do not leave wide gaps in a wall intended to protect them from attack . . . Even as his objective was to provoke combat so his wagon-line was a device to destroy the enemy” (Williams quoted by Sandhu, 2003: 440). Babur’s wagons were just as necessary in actively destroying the enemy as his heavy cavalry, which were combined with his artillery and firepower. Sarkar notes that Babur perfected the art of fire-and-movement 300 years before the general Napoleon and the theorist Jomini (1984: 219).

This battle was requested by someone in the early development of this website all the way back in 2008. When beginning such a project, encouragement is crucial to continuing it, so Sameer, if you’re still following the site: thanks for the support and sorry for the wait.

I anticipate that this will be another animation that stirs controversy over my choice of numbers for each side. I chose to rely upon Sandhu’s A Military History of Medieval India because it provides the most detail regarding the composition of each army. Most sources place the size of the Mughal army at 8-15,000 but they rely upon Babur’s own estimates of having 12,000 cavalry and a few thousand infantry. Babur’s estimate only includes his 12,000 Turkish cavalry which he felt he could rely upon (Sandhu, 2003: 435). As a historian writing centuries later, I cannot set a precedent for counting only forces the commander felt most confident in.

- Jonathan Webb

Works Consulted

Babur. Memoirs of Babur. Translated by Annette Susannah Beveridge. Delhi: Low Price, 1989.

Davis, Paul K. 100 Decisive Battles from Ancient Times to the Present. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Dupuy, Trevor N. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 BC to the Present, Fourth Edition. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.

Hasan, Mohibbul. Babur: Founder of the Mughal Empire in India. New Delhi: Manohar, 1985.

Sandhu, Gurcharn Sing. A Military History of Medieval India. New Delhi: Vision, 2003.

Sarkar, Jagadish Narayan. The Art of War in Medieval India. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharal, 1984.

Williams, Rushbrook. An Empire Builder of the Sixteenth Century: A Summary of the Political Career of Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad Surnamed Babur. London: Longmans & Green, 1918.

Images

Afghan cavalry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_83b_figure_1.htm

Afghan infantry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_83b_figure_1.htm

Afghan war elephant: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_83b_figure_1.htm

Babur: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Babur

Ibrahim Lodi: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibrahim_Lodi

Mughal artillery: http://forums.civfanatics.com/showthread.php?t=399079&page=6

Mughal cavalry: httphttp://greatestbattles.iblogger.org/MysoreWars/ArmiesOfTheWarsInIndia_byPaulDStevenson.htm

Mughal infantry: http://greatestbattles.iblogger.org/MysoreWars/ArmiesOfTheWarsInIndia_byPaulDStevenson.htm

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Battle of Tuyuti, 1866

Jonathan Webb — Sun, 31 Jul 2011 02:47:13 +0000

Francisco Selano López versus Luís Manuel Osório and Bartolomé Mitre: A Paraguayan army under López fails to achieve surprise before attacking an Allied army under Osório and Mitre. Can Osório and Mitre repel López’ frenzied frontal assault and deep double envelopment? Also known as the Battle of Tuiuti and Paso de Patria. Click on images below to view PowerPoint presentation. | Legend |

This battle possesses two characters, one of myth and one of reality. The myth of the battle should not be read as falsehood but as events of remarkable nature. The battle has been described as “a series of charges and countercharges, a Latin American version of Waterloo” (Williams, 2000: 61), an incredible compliment. The Paraguayans had fought so bravely despite all their disadvantages “to the extent that the story ran around the allied armies that they had been fed brandy laced with gunpowder” (Leuchars, 2002: 134). Even Osório admitted the Paraguayan attack was in fact “magnificent” (Williams, 2000: 61). Numerous stories of heroism on both sides are well-documented and engrained within accounts of the battle.

The harsher reality is that the battle was still a battle, a violent collision of two deadly forces. For all the stories of heroism, many are quite gruesome, such as the image of Paraguayan soldiers “casually munching biscuits while their legs were being amputated” (Leuchars, 2002: 127). Williams relays eyewitness accounts of a “swamp of blood” and that months later, “the stench of death was still almost suffocating” (2000: 64).

There is considerable debate regarding the consequences of the war from the Paraguayan point of view. The more well-known argument is that there was no purpose for Paraguay to instigate a war and that López was a megalomaniac dictator. The other argument is that the war actually did benefit Paraguay, eventually at least, and that López was a hero. Leuchars makes an argument for this lesser-known claim:

Paraguay ended the war with the loss of some 55,000 square miles, or a quarter of its national territory. Yet, however bad this might seem, it was still less than Argentina and Brazil had been trying to extract from it in peaceful negotiations in the first half of the century, and if the Treaty of the Triple Alliance did represent the long-term aims of those countries, then López’s resistance might be said to have counted for something. Nor did it eventually cost them anything in reparations, for each of the Allies subsequently canceled its war debt.

These are not idle considerations. Judging by the turmoil in the Plate region in the early 1860s, it seems unlikely that Paraguay could have resisted for long the ambitions of its neighbors; sooner or later, it would have had to part with territory – and probably lots of it. It could be argued that the mutual rivalry between Argentina and Brazil would have limited this, but these two did seem to be cooperating alarmingly well at the start, and they seemed determined enough during the war to pursue their stated ends. It may not be too far-fetched to suggest that despite the huge losses of land and of people, López had in fact defended relatively successfully the independence of his country. (2002: 235-236)

López’ decision to instigate the battle by attacking was the first of many mistakes he made that day. He attacked the Allies to spoil their apparent plans for an attack of their own but how it was preferable to be the attacker rather than the defender in this context is not known. It can be argued that time was not on López’ side and that a decisive victory was needed (Leuchars, 2002: 126) but the plan and execution of the attack are unpardonable. López planned to stealthily advance his assault columns through the dense brush and assault at dawn. The plan depended on surprise and timing (Williams, 2000: 58), neither of which were achieved.

Throughout May, nearly every night featured some sort of exchange of fire including an attack on May 2 and the Allies had not fully nestled into the positions they occupied days before the Paraguayan attack: “For his moment of attack, López had probably chosen one when the Allies were best prepared for it” (Leuchars, 2002: 119). López also failed to properly reconnoiter the terrain his columns would pass through; the varying difficulty they would face negotiating the thorny brush not only meant the assault was not launched until noon, instead dawn, but the assault columns did not attack simultaneously. While López could not even see the battle from the rear, Osório, Mitre and their subordinates tirelessly encouraged and directed their troops.

López did not bring his entire force to the battle and senselessly left 6,000 soldiers in reserve to the north, seemingly in case of the need to retreat, completely contradictory to his decision that a decisive battle must be fought and won. López would have been better served by focusing his attack on the Allied right. The terrain on the Allied right was better suited for a breakthrough attack while demonstrations against other sections of the Allied line would have been effective given the concealment they would enjoy.

After the disappointingly vague animation for Ayacucho, I was determined to impress my South American viewers who, despite poor representation in battles thus far, show a keen interest in the site. I used as many sources as I could get a hold of researching this battle and owe many thanks to a kind Brazilian historian who helped me overcome a few vague aspects of my own research with his own non-English sources. The majority of detail for this battle is derived from Hoyt’s “Swamp of Blood,” which was readily accessible. I hope this animation is satisfactory and gives this magnificent battle the attention it deserves.

- Jonathan Webb

Works Consulted

Doratioto, Francisco. Maldita Guerra: Nova história da Guerra do Paraguai. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002.

Dupuy, Trevor N. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 BC to the Present, Fourth Edition. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.

Kolinski, Charles J. Independence or Death: The Story of the Paraguayan War. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1965.

Leuchars, Chris. To the Bitter End: Paraguay and the War of the Triple Alliance. London: Greenwood, 2002.

Murad, Abid. A Batalha de Tuiuti e Uma Licao de Civismo. Rio de Janeiro, Biblioteca do Exercito, 1957

Thompson, George. The War in Paraguay. London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1869.

Scheina, Robert L. Latin America’s Wars Vol. 1: The Age of the Caudillo, 1791-1899. New York: Potomac, 2003.

Williams, John Hoyt. “A Swamp of Blood: The Battle of Tuyuti.” Military History 17.1 (2000): 58-64.

Images

Allied soldiers: http://img80.imageshack.us/img80/2761/brvol6570.jpg

Bartolomé Mitre: http://www.portalplanetasedna.com.ar/mitre.htm

Francisco Selano López: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francisco_Solano_L%C3%B3pez

Luís Manuel Osório: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manuel_Lu%C3%ADs_Os%C3%B3rio,_Marquis_of_Erval

Paraguyan soldiers: http://www.erroluys.com/Kindle/KindleIllustratedGuide2.htm#Brazilians

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Battle of Poltava, 1709

Jonathan Webb — Fri, 08 Jul 2011 04:23:21 +0000

Peter the Great versus Karl Rehnskjold and Charles XII: A Swedish army under Rehnskjold and Charles loses the element of surprise before it attacks a Russian army under Peter. Can Rehnskjold and Charles rely on the Swedish soldier’s reputation of past victories or has Peter successfully built a Russian soldier which can hold its own? Click on images below to view PowerPoint presentation.

| Legend |

Poltava holds a place on every list of decisive battles because it marks the irreversible rise of one state’s power and influence at the expense of another’s. Peter’s victory in the Great Northern War would bring Russia closer to Europe not just geographically but culturally. In purely empirical, military terms however, Poltava is less significant. The battle was fought deep within Russia as Peter taps the traditional Russian strategy of eluding battle and weakening the enemy with the harsh climate. Anything short of a crushing victory for the Swedes only led them deeper into Russia. Peter’s victory at Poltava did not immediately bear fruits as he was lucky to escape from the Turks at all in his disastrous Pruth campaign of 1711. But Peter’s victory at Poltava is consistent with trends of the subsequent history and thus serves as a sort of placeholder in history.

Tactically, this battle is fairly easy to analyze given the challenges in communication, command and control Charles and Rehnskjold created for themselves. The Swedish army was unified in purpose from the highest officer to the lowest soldier – Lewenhaupt’s strict compliance with detested orders to rejoin the army rather than storm the Russian camp prove this – but it was not clear how the battle was to go. Bengstton claims only two Swedish generals other than Rehnskjold and Charles were explicitly familiar with the plan of attack (1960: 348). Fuller argues the “Swedish unity of command was non-existent” and that “it is important to bear this in mind, for otherwise the battle of Poltava becomes unintelligible” (1956: 176).

Peter, for his part, incidentally magnified Swedish command issues with the sudden construction of the line of redoubts perpendicular to the original line which instantly divided the Swedish army. The real talent of Peter however was not as a field commander – although he performed well at Poltava – but as an administrator. The army he gained victory with at Poltava was completely his own, built from the defeated ruins of the Battle of Narva in 1700.

Charles’ plan did not recognize that the Russian army had improved greatly since Narva and was likely going to fail even if all went well. Charles’ plan was to rush past the redoubts, march across the edge of the plain and then position themselves between the Russians and their ford at Petrovka; Peter would then be forced to accept Charles’ challenge to fight a reversed front battle or starve. The plan is impressive in its audacity and consideration of the indirect approach but many of the same factors in the actual Swedish defeat remain. The Russians would still hold an overwhelming superiority in infantry and artillery whose performance would completely shock Charles. Peter would have likely calmly lead his army out of camp and defeated the Swedes, a disastrous result for any army fighting a reversed front battle.

I resisted animating this battle because I felt it would be confusing or less informative due to the Swedish command issues. However, I feel such issues should not be excluded from a visual representation of war and strategy, being just as important as which weapons were used or where units were deployed.

Note on commander labels: they are a disaster. Sources’ maps simply did not agree with each other in the least and so I added commander labels based on who actually influenced the sector or who was “really” in charge. I did this by being consistent with the narrative of the battle as a whole. For example, technically or at least according to one confident source, the four Swedish columns from left to right were commanded by Charles, Roos, Stackelberg and Sparre, and were under the overall command of Lewenhaupt (Massie, 1981: 492). However, my labels make it clearer which commanders were on the ground with which formations and who actually exerted influence and command over them.

This animation took much longer than expected but turned out much better as well. When I initially scout battles, I typically use fairly general sources (books like Davis’ 100 Decisive Battles for example) to get an idea of what the essence of the battle was, what made it special. When I am actually taking notes on battles, I begin with these broader sources and move on to more specific sources which go in to more depth. This way, I slowly get a sense of the important details first but don’t have to write down the same things over and over. However, this battle changed drastically the more detailed it became and I was constantly shaking my head. By putting more time into this animation, I overcame the issues with sources and was able to include the genuine friction that took place between commanders and their subordinates, and of course, the two armies.

- Jonathan Webb

Works Consulted

Bengtsson, Frans Gunnar. The Life of Charles XII, King of Sweden 1697-1718. London: Macmillan, 1960.

Davis, Paul K. 100 Decisive Battles from Ancient Times to the Present. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Frost, Robert I. The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721. New York: Longman, 2000.

Fuller, J.F.C. The Decisive Battles of the Western World Vol. 2. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1956.

Jackson, W.G.F. Seven Roads to Moscow. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957.

Massie, Robert K. Peter the Great, his Life and World. London: V. Gollancz, 1981.

Stone, David R. A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006.

Images

Karl Rehnskjold: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_Gustaf_Rehnski%C3%B6ld

Charles XII: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_xii

Peter the Great: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_the_Great

Russian artillery: http://www.models2u.co.uk/Shop/contents/en-uk/d1178.html

Russian cavalry: http://www.models2u.co.uk/Shop/contents/en-uk/d1178.html

Russian infantry: http://www.models2u.co.uk/Shop/contents/en-uk/d1178.html

Swedish artillery: http://www.models2u.co.uk/Shop/contents/en-uk/d1178.html

Swedish cavalry: http://www.models2u.co.uk/Shop/contents/en-uk/d1178.html

Swedish infantry: http://www.models2u.co.uk/Shop/contents/en-uk/d1178.html

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Battle of Varna, 1444

Jonathan Webb — Sun, 08 May 2011 19:48:49 +0000

John Hunyadi versus Murad II: A Crusader army under Hunyadi chooses terrain to secure its flanks against an Ottoman army under Murad. Can Hunyadi maintain control over his multinational forces and repel Murad’s grand attack? Click on images below to view PowerPoint presentation. | Legend |

While nominally a “crusade,” do not get too engrossed in the rhetoric and historical framing of battles such as this as merely episodes in an ongoing civilizational-religious war. Modern politics has a tendency to consolidate any battles between Christian and Muslim factions into a continuous timeline, one inevitably leading to the next up until the present day. To simplify history into a struggle between two homogenous factions is to ignore the vital complexities of history and warfare. That being said, Ottoman victory at Varna precipitated the destruction of Byzantium and within a few decades brought the Ottomans to the gates of Vienna.

Poor command and control doomed Hunyadi’s efforts: first the impetuous charge by the bishops on his right wing, then the Wallachians’ abrupt flight from the battlefield, and finally the suicidal attack by King Vladislav. Hunyadi led from the front and, indeed, his presence correlated with smashing victories wherever he was. But he could simply not be everywhere at once and failed to exercise authority over his army as a whole. Murad for his part ensured the obedience of his subordinates and the battle plan was typical of most Ottoman engagements: create disorder with skirmishers and then hit the enemy wings while preserving one’s center.

This battle replaced the highly anticipated Siege of Belgrade, 1456 when I failed to find the necessary maps to animate it. Luckily, my long list of possible battles is rich with Ottoman battles between 1300-1600 and was easily replaced by Varna. After unexpectedly animating Strasbourg and Varna, I am vowing to focus on battles that have been long announced and likely long anticipated.

The Crusader strength was fairly easy to estimate as all sources estimated between 15-23,000 and all of the low estimates seemed to not include the 4,000 Wallachians who joined the army fairly late. The Ottoman strength I settled on is much lower than any estimate my sources provided; in fact the lowest I found was 30-40,000 (Housley, 1992: 88) with most being around 60,000 while acknowledging uncertainty (Chasin, 1989: 304). Unfortunately, my most valuable source, a biography of Hunyadi by Muresanu, did not even venture to make an estimate (2001: 110-111). Such extraordinary numerical superiority is not consistent with the events of the battle and reeks of grandiose medieval tales of defeating an endless torrent of inferior enemies. Two pieces of information were key to my estimate. First, sources were consistent in their estimates of how large particular units were; there were 6,000 skirmishers, 7-8,000 Rumelian cavalry and fewer Anatolian cavalry, let’s say 6,000 for a total of 19-20,000. The only formation missing is the infantry which likely did not comprise a great proportion of the Ottoman army, the Janissaries being quite few in number at this stage of history. Second, Pears writes that 100,000 Ottomans crossed into Europe and that by the time of the battle, 60,000 or 60% opposed the Crusaders (1903: 165). These numbers are too high for such a war, insignificant at least compared to the grand campaign against Cosntantinople in 1453, but they provide us with a ratio. So if 40,000 Ottomans crossed into Europe, our lowest, most prevalent estimate, then applying our 60% ratio taking part in the battle is consistent with my estimate based on individual formations.

Our most reliable casualty figure is 3-12,000 for each side (Muresanu, 2001: 111). Estimates of Ottoman casualties are astronomically ridiculous and estimates of 10,000 Crusader casualties (Heath, 1984: 97; Haywood, 2002) seem too high considering how only 16,000 were heavily engaged.

- Jonathan Webb

Works Consulted

Babinger, Franz. Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Chasin, Martin. “The Crusade of Varna.” In A History of the Crusades Vol. 6: The Impact of the Crusades on Europe, 276-310. Edited by Kenneth M. Setton. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.

Dupuy, Trevor N. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 BC to the Present, Fourth Edition. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.

Haywood, Matthew. “Hungarian Tactics and Significant Battles.” Warfare East. http://www.warfareeast.co.uk/main/Hungarian_Battles.htm (accessed Apr. 22, 2011).

Heath, Ian. Armies of the Middle Ages Vol. 2: The Ottoman Empire, Eastern Europe and the Near East, 1300-1500. Sussex: Flexprint, 1984.

Housley, Norman. The Later Crusades, 1274-1580. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Imber, Colin. The Crusade of Varna, 1443-1445: Crusade Texts in Translation. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006.

Inalcik, Halil. “The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades, 1329-1451.” In A History of the Crusades Vol. 6: The Impact of the Crusades on Europe, 222-275. Edited by Kenneth M. Setton. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.

Muresanu, Camil. John Hunyadi: Defender of Christendom. Translated by Laura Treptow. Portland: Center for Romanian Studies, 2001.

Pears, Edwin. Destruction of the Greek Empire. New York: Haskell, 1968.

Thuroczy, Janos. Chronicle of the Hungarians. Translated by Frank Mantello. Bloomington: Indiana University, 1991.

Images

Hungarian cavalry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_166_figure_1.htm

John Hunyadi: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Hunyadi

Murad II: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murad_II

Ottoman cavalry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_160b_figure_1.htm

Ottoman infantry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_160b_figure_1.htm

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On the Development of Military Organization

Jonathan Webb — Fri, 15 Apr 2011 20:26:11 +0000

By Chase Englund

To tell the story of the way the military is organized, manned and supplied is to tell the story of society itself. Each different stage is a reflection of that state of society. In the earliest hunter gatherer groups, everyone was of essentially a single class. The chief led the ‘army’, but everyone participated. War was a means of socialization for men, but it did not exist as we know it today. The first real mass slaughters using organized formations came with the first civilizations with farms, animals, and riches to protect or steal.

This essay will attempt to divide military organization up into several distinct stages. As with all simplifications and generalizations, there are exceptions, but this essay will attempt to uncover some basic general truths about how a society’s military is organized, and how this changes as said society advances. It is necessary here to define what is meant by ‘organization’. In the context it will be used here, it means who can participate in the military and in what role. It does not mean the actual tactical makeup of said militaries, as this is the topic for another essay.

Feudal

In the most primitive societies, where power lies in the hands of a local warlord, armies are generally small. The military in a society like this will be led by a local warlord or baron, and mainly composed of the wealthy landowners beneath him. To understand why they are organized like this, one must have a rudimentary understanding of how a society in this stage of development functions.

This type of unadvanced agrarian society is based on subsistence farming. Almost everyone is a poor farmer (maybe fisherman near the coast) and he provides the food for the few leaders, clergymen, or government officials at the top. Another fact of life in this type of society is war. Raiding is a means of gathering more slaves and resources. Once you have enough, you can take more land, which allows more farming, which supports more people, etc. So thus small wars are common to society like this, because they are the quickest way to gain wealth and power.

Now, to the lowly farmer in this type of society, the military is viewed very differently from how people in our society view it. First of all, it means traveling away from the farm, and includes the chance of getting rich from loot. It also means a steady meal, and aside from the fighting, the work certainly is not any worse than subsistence farming. Military service is becomes extremely attractive. This effect is observed even today in Africa, in the feudalistic ‘failed states’ seen there. It is often necessary to bribe recruiters substantially to even be considered for service. It was the same in feudal Europe. War was for the rich. Equipment was self-provided and costly.

To give a man weapons is to empower him, which is the second reason that war was only for the rich. With the purpose of keeping the serfs obedient in mind, it would be terribly unwise to issue them weapons and training and use them in a serious way. They would just as soon turn these weapons on their leaders and relieve their position in society. Now this isn’t to say that the farmers were never used. When necessary, they are given inferior weapons and used as infantry. In medieval Europe, this resulted in armies of rich mounted knights, and body of poorly trained, loosely formed infantry, maybe supplemented by a few skirmishers with slings and bows, also peasants. It is now well known that highly organized infantry can defeat head on cavalry charges, but in terms of medieval organizational capabilities, this was not possible. This meant if the poorer infantrymen tried any sort of rebellion, they would easily be obliterated by the colossal warhorses of their masters.

Now, in theory, we should observe a very similar military style in the feudal regions of the world today, but of course, these societies do not exist in a vacuum, and things like global trade, western intervention, soviet arms dealers, and modern drugs have significantly altered the natural state of the unadvanced regions of the world. Underdeveloped nations today have the option of simply buying modern weapons from the west. Nevertheless, a strange form of feudal military organization still exists in regions like Africa. Modern weapons does not entail a modern societal structure, and that is something that we cannot sell them.

Also important to note here is the use of mercenaries in these societies. This was especially popular in Europe circa the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as monarchs tried to advance from feudalistic societies to more centralized states. European monarchs needed to quickly augment their militaries with professional troops, but this would have meant incorporating the nobles into military leadership. It was during this period that the nobles (essentially regional warlords) were especially resistant to the trend of centralization in European states, and so giving them the Officer Corps too soon would have had mutinous implications. Landowners during this period still commanded enough wealth to challenge the state sovereign. And this is not to mention the burden of shouldering the heavy cost of new gunpowder weapons. Thus, the cheaper and politically safe option was to hire mercenaries. Interestingly, almost the exact same phenomena of sovereigns using mercenaries to unite their states can be observed today in many third world areas. A similar situation can be observed in the recent Libyan Civil War (see footnote).^

Theocratic

The next stage in the development of a society is what we will call a theocracy. This is when an entire nationality has been united under a single military leader, and he now rules it as a sort of ‘god king’. Historical and contemporary examples of this are plentiful. The great Egyptian pharaohs, Alexander the Great and Hellenistic Greece, the Early Roman kings, the Aztecs Emperors, and the late medieval European kings, or even modern day North Korea are all examples of this.

This type of society functions in a manner quite more advanced than it did during its feudal past. A society in this stage is sometimes referred to as a city-state, as it will often develop one major trade city in which the leader lives and from which the nation is controlled. These societies are rigidly hierarchal and centrally controlled, typically by means of some sort of religion or central theology, of which the ruler exists as the head priest. This can even be observed today in some of the smaller communist nations, in governments exhibiting what is referred to today as a ‘cult of personality’. The ruler of such a nation exists as a living God, immediately deified following his death. The great pyramids, the Colossus of Rhodes, the great Cathedrals and fortresses of Europe, the great Greek temples are all testaments to the new types of organizational capabilities inherent to these societies. Centrally organized mass farming and better storage techniques create surpluses of food, which can support hordes of slave laborers.

Needless to say, these societal changes create new military capabilities as well. Armies can march father thanks to some primitive logistics abilities. Equipment begins to be standardized and provided by the government, thanks to new wealth and organized labor. Tactics and organization reach a new maturity and discipline. Members of armies in this state are typically much more conditioned and willing to remain in a cohesive formation during battle. Better organization is only half the reason for this. In less advanced societies, the infantry is composed of commoners, who will understandably be less politically committed and more poorly trained. In a theocracy, in addition to the cavalry, the infantry is also composed of the wealthy. The reason for this is that a military in this stage will inevitability be fighting other, non feudal opponents, and it needs strong, cohesive infantry to do this. It is a basic fact of warfare that well organized infantry, prepared to receive the charge, will nearly always defeat a head on cavalry attack. This is especially true when the cavalry is using horses, which simply will not charge into a hedge of spikes, regardless of their masters’ feelings on the matter. In a feudal society when everyone you’re fighting has poorly organized infantry units, you can afford to have an army whose core is the cavalry, because you will never face a determined body of infantry. But this is not true of a unified nation, which will be facing other, more advanced armies. Simply put, it’s a matter of competition. Once an army starts facing effective heavy infantry, they must produce their own to face them, unless they want to be soundly defeated in every engagement. And teaching peasants to soldier really effectively is impossible, due to the same reasons described in the last section. The result is that the landowners themselves must make up the infantry, and that is precisely what happens.

There will also be a decently developed officer corps, although its members will be only the wealthiest landowners. In a less developed military, this would have been politically dangerous, but war increasingly becomes a rich man’s game, a game that requires the centralized organization and trade wealth that only states can muster, not regional landowners. The army will also still be led by the nation’s political ruler. This is a crucial fact. If control of the army is given away to professional generals too soon, said generals will simply use the army they have been given to install themselves into power. This has happened many times, especially in modern countries trying (admirably) to embrace democracy before their society is structured for it. The reason this does not happen in today’s most modern societies will be explained in following sections. Armies serving a society in this stage will also sometimes augment their forces with large slave units, which would of course be more poorly equipped and used as skirmishers or light infantry.

Early Nation State

As a nation continues to advance, it eventually accumulates enough trade and a sufficiently stable food supply to free its peasants and begin to operate a free market economy. This shouldn’t be confused with an industrial economy, these societies are still largely agrarian, but the farmers are free. Trade and mercantilism are sufficiently lucrative and stable enough to support a larger chunk of the population. As the central government becomes larger and more influential, there develops an increasing desire among the wealthy merchants and traders (the beginnings of the middle class) to be heard in the decision-making. In the past, policy was simple, farm as much as possible, raid as much as possible. Now with the increasing complexity of trade, things get more complicated, and those in minor positions of power demand more recognition. And increasingly, they will have accumulated the wealth and influence to get it. While raiding may provide a short burst of income, trade is now far more important, and the new thing to fight over. A nation in this state will almost certainly begin to accumulate colonies, as it has discovered that the trade and resources are well worth the cost of installing a government there. Needless to say, politics becomes greatly more complicated and opinionated. This instability leads to the beginnings of a limited republic; usually in the form of a business aristocracy or senate. Beyond these political reasons for more democratic government, other practical military concerns emerge.

With conquest and trade protection becoming more and more important, the military also inherently grows in importance. In earlier stages of war, tactics were simple. The nation’s leader would command the simple formations himself. Now, although the military is still led by the head of state, he will have a full staff of advisors and officers to lead the increasingly complex formations. At this point military service is offered to anyone, but the poorer classes are still slightly more poorly equipped, and used in less important roles such as archers.

However, eventually these advancements also allow, or rather force, the government to open up military service to anyone. The army is no longer composed of the upper classmen, who simply become unwilling. In democratic and business oriented system, there are safer and surer ways of gaining wealth and power, such as politics, than conquering more land. When they did serve, it was primarily as officers, a sure track to political success and battlefield glory. Enlistment in the military became the occupation of the desperate and poor. However, manning your military with the lower classes, and leaving it in command of business class officers has implications of its own. The government loses much of its ability to simply control the public through military force. Suffrage inevitably expands to those with economic clout, now including the wealthier business class members of society, along with landowners. This is also not to mention the fact that any modern military will be funded through taxes paid by the business class. Disenfranchising them means cutting off this funding. King Charles faced this problem during the English Civil War.

It is during this stage that there will often be a period in which only nobles or, more recently, members of the president’s party will be allowed officer rank. This is an attempt to preserve the status quo and maintain a balance of power between the traditional power holders and the rising business classes. In times of war, a primitive form of conscription may emerge. These conscripts will be paid, however they will be ‘militias’ and still more poorly equipped than the volunteer force.

With an army consisting of more ‘uncivilized’ men, more draconian forms of discipline emerge. Discipline is strictly regimented, and disobedience is harshly punished. A more familiar army discipline begins to take shape, with drill sergeants, separate military courts, deserters being shot, and so on.

Capitalized Nation State

Around this time, if the proper catalysts are in place, a banking system and finally stock market will be developed. This fully modernizes the economy, apart from industrialization of course. At this stage, if he isn’t already, the head of state will begin to be elected popularly, usually by members of the senate. This is usually done in an advanced society to ensure the competency of the leader and favorability with the senate’s agenda.

This change allows most of the control of the military to be given to professional officers. Previously this would have dangerous implications politically, but in a democracy, with a popularly elected head of state, the danger diminishes. A majority of aristocrats support the head of state, which is why he was able to secure election to begin with. Furthermore, his image as a popularly elected leader gives him much more loyalty among the populous. The combination of these factors makes a lasting coup very unlikely and politically nearly impossible. The leaders of the military will themselves be members of the upper class, and generally support the new democratic system. Generals and Field Marshals now head the army in the place of kings. It is important to note, however, that even today the nation’s leader is still officially in charge.

These changes in the economic system also allow other interesting developments to take place. A treasury of static wealth is now replaced by a central bank, which invests and propagates its money. This is the final nail in the coffin of warfare for the sake of raiding. Another important development which occurs at this time is the possibility of a draft. Although it is unnecessary and unpopular in anything other than a serious war against other great powers, the state’s new economic abilities allow it to conscript, and then equip and pay vast amounts of men, previously impossible. Nationalism also becomes more effective and prevalent. The size of conventional armies increases twofold, if not more. Large scale, or mass voting, previously impractical, is also now made possible by better organization. Commoners, or workers as they are now called, not only man the armies, but also live in dense cities, where they can communicate and organize strikes, a serious threat to economic output. Voting rights are offered to every free man, instead of only the wealthy or landowners.

It is interesting to note here how this change came about in Europe. The French monarchy had tried to keep an outdated system of government in place despite changes in the economy, and despite recruiting soldiers from the public. This created instability and finally a revolution. The force of commercialization and the emergence of a middle class were finally enough to undo governments that refused to enfranchise them. Once their state was modernized, they could use the draft, which Napoleon did to great effect. Furthermore, Napoleon was not a nobleman, and cared little for the unspoken understanding among the royalty of Europe that total war was ungentlemanly. He modernized his state politically, which allowed him to unleash the military potential of a modern state (i.e. mass conscription, professional officer corps). All of this scared the God out the European nobility, who sought to replace Napoleon with a proper monarch and go back to the status quo, where they held a firm grip on power. This, of course, was a pipe dream, and failed. The monarchies of Europe were thus forced to modernize their own countries in order to defeat Napoleon and others like him in the future. Thus ended their age of limited war.

Industrialized State

As the state advances even farther down the road of civilization, we reach a period called industrialization. As most people know, this means that the organization and technology has been developed to create assembly line factories which can produce mass quantities of cheap goods. However, beyond that, government organization also begins to reach previously unimaginable levels. The government can now organize and fund research into better technologies, with devastating results. In a first-or-early-second-tier industrial economy warfare takes on the shape of a gigantic industrial operation, both sides pumping as many men and machines onto the front as possible in order to the wear the other down. The levee, usually called the draft in the United States, is mandatory and all encompassing. Of course, the rich may be able to delay their service with further education, and possibly enter as officers, but in wars like this, this is a small percentage. Industrial wars are an existential struggle for the economic systems that wage them. The losing side, and oftentimes many of its people, is utterly obliterated.

As economies advance farther, more towards the late second tier or third tier level, nations develop the means to effectively mass produce thermonuclear missiles. This changes warfare considerably. Warfare is now not only an extremely costly, devastating struggle to be undertaken only for the most important reasons, but it is now literally suicidal. The only way to win an industrial war is to strike at the heart of the industry which sustains it. In the more primitive industrial wars, this was done with strategic bombers. Today it is done with nuclear weapons. Strategic bombing is done with such speed and lethal efficiency that conventional armies have almost ceased to become significant. The industry that supported them would be destroyed before they could even deploy. With this in mind, it is not surprising that the size of most modern armies has shrunk considerably. Now there are other reasons for this, and reasons for them to grow again as well, however these will be discussed in the following section.

Once again, as the economic structure of the western world changed, the military began to change as well. As the industrial economies reached their most recent stage, consumerism, the social fabric of society began to shift as well. In an agrarian economy, marriage is a prerequisite to financial success. A man needs his wife to have as many children as possible, because children are free labor to make his farm more productive. He also needs his wife to stick around and help raise said children. Likewise, the woman needs a husband to provide for her financially, as labor is typically intensely physical in nature. Gender roles in society are well defined. It takes serious physical strength to farm and fight, so men did this. Women stayed in the home and managed affairs there. However, in an industrial economy, especially in a consumer based third tier economy, these distinctions are blurred.

For several reasons, traditional family structure begins to break down. Here we will focus only on those changes which are of military significance. Firstly, women can operate as financially independent units, and are significant contributors to the economy, especially in wartime when men are away fighting. This essentially means that they will gain suffrage, just as common men did when they became economically and militarily important. In the US, women gained their voting rights promptly after the First World War, when their importance was exhibited. Years later, when the US economy was firmly based in the third tier, they gained the right to actually serve in the armed forces. The differences in gender roles are quickly eroding. It also follows that since marriage is no longer an economic or social necessity, its main underpinnings become love and sex. Among various other things, this has led to an increase in homosexual behavior, and thus an increase in the acceptance of it. Unsurprisingly, this has led to the admission of homosexuals into the military. Needless to say, social norms have changed slower than the economy, so these changes have been gradual.

One of the most important facts about industrialization in regards to the way the military is organized is that industrial war, especially nuclear weapons, has made long term total war very unlikely. This has in turn made a future draft very unlikely.

Postindustrial Trends

It would be erroneous not to mention that allowing women and gays to join is not entirely due to social change, but also has the important practical purpose of increasing recruitment. The shrinking of the modern army is not entirely due to nuclear warfare. A consumer society is a relatively self centered one, and recruitment has become more of a challenge. Contrarily, our methods of dealing with insurgencies have become more manpower intensive. Historically, a draft has never really been necessary in the small colonial wars customarily fought today. Previously, these problems were dealt with by simply rounding up all suspects, oftentimes with their families, and shooting them. One simply becomes more threatening than the insurgents. This is still practiced in parts of the world. However, in the western world, this clearly is not a politically viable option. So to persuade the populous, instead of becoming more violent than the guerillas, western armies now protect the population from the guerillas altogether. This has proven effective, but takes a lot more men to constantly protect every settlement in an entire country. The result has been a lot more strain on and constant deployment of the armed forces. These operations take much longer now, as the occupying force must now wait until the locals can get their own security up and running (and running in a politically acceptable way, not an easy task in less developed regions). The result has been constant deployment and the beginnings of what could almost be described as a military subculture. Ask any military official today, and they will relate concerns on problems they are having reintegrating military veterans back into a society of which they were removed for so long. Some organizations use this difficultly as an outright recruiting tool. The obvious solution would be a draft, but as was learned in Vietnam, using a draft outside of a serious conventional war is extremely unpopular, especially in a consumer society. Countries like Israel have only been able to maintain a draft so well due only to serious external threats to its existence. For now, in the western nations burdened by guerrilla wars, recruitment remains a constant problem. This is also a factor which has led to a more accepting military. Another effect has been the increasing prevalence of mercenaries (or private defense companies, as they are labeled today). In fact, private contractors now make up a huge portion the American military force in foreign occupations. Throughout history, when more men are needed to fight a colonial war, mercenaries are often used as a substitute for a draft, which may be either impossible or extremely unpopular. This is often indicative of overextension. Examples of this include the Romans in Germania, the British in America, or even the Americans in Iraq. Another solution is the increased use of unmanned aircraft and machines, although this is also part of the recent emphasis on technology, discussed below.

Another recent trend in the military is the heavy emphasis on technology. In part, this perception is due simply to the fact that as our economy advances, technology advances with it and becomes cheaper. But this is only part of the reason. In many western countries, but primarily the United States, there exists an extremely powerful defense industry, referred to by President Eisenhower as the ‘Military Industrial Complex’. Without getting too political or naming specifics companies, it is clear that some large defense companies intentionally lobby congress and the pentagon for contracts and new weapons programs, no matter how redundant or unnecessary. Billions of dollars are spent on new programs which are only marginally more effective than their predecessors. However, problems like these not only find their root in overly powerful industry, but in electoral politics as well. It is a well understood fact that to entirely obliterate a large nation like the Soviet Union would require about 2000 thermonuclear weapons. The fact that the United States developed far more than this is a testament to the political power of phrases such as ‘missile gap’. The arms race with the Soviets reached the point where it was much more about politics and taking a hard stance towards the Russians, than it was about warfighting capabilities.

Another important fact to recognize is that for the foreseeable future, long term industrial wars are not going to happen. There may still be conventional wars, but in this nuclear age, they will be quickly decided and a treaty will be made before things get out of hand. This knowledge that future conventional wars will be short has led most western militaries to develop extremely potent, but not quickly replaceable, military forces. The idea is that future wars will not last long enough to require the kind of vast industrial output of military machines seen in the past. The draft is seen as unnecessary. Now that nations have gained the ability to destroy an opponent’s industry almost instantly, the concept of long industrial wars is gone. Now that nuclear weapons have provided insurance against invaders to any state that can develop them, it seems the great struggles of annihilation have ended. Today, like in 18th century Europe, we live in an age of limited war. Instead of a mutual understanding between related nobles, there is the mutual understanding of annihilation. Perhaps, in some distant future, nations will develop a ‘nuclear shield’, which would reverse these ends, make industrial war and the draft real possibilities again, but for now this is but a pipe dream. It seems for now the great powers will have to live with one another.

One interesting result of such a heavy emphasis on technology has been the creation of a vast ‘shadow army’ of individuals who make the military machine run. Many of today’s service men and women could be more likened to computer technicians than to any traditional idea of a warrior.**

In conclusion, the way the military is organized is, in the end a result of the society that fields it. It has changed vastly since the beginnings of society, and will probably continue to change with future developments. But the one thing that will always remain is war. It has followed man since the first crops were planted and the first walls were erected, as if to spite our hopes of a utopia. Fighting to improve his position is the natural instinct of man. What remains to be seen is whether or not this desire can sustain itself as we travel ever farther down the winding road of civilization.

^Muammar Gaddafi has notoriously used mercenaries, as well as paramilitary groups from his own tribe, in attempt to reinstate control over Libya. Libya has advanced economically, especially in the east, and there has been a refusal by Gaddafi to expand political enfranchisement, even so much as to create a senate. This has inevitably led to revolution. To suppress this revolution, Gaddafi cannot use a regular army, equipped by volunteers, funded and led by business class citizens. In the east, he cannot use members of the political elite, the ‘nobility’ so to speak, because economic advancement there has seen a decline in the influence of such a class in favor of the new business class. He must use members of his own western ‘nobility’, and these forces are not sufficient to win. Thus, he must hire mercenaries to augment his forces, very similarly to many sixteenth century European monarchs, albeit for different reasons.

*Mercenaries are often used to avoid giving military capability, thus leverage, to undesirable groups. This could be nobles as a state advances, but it could also be commoners as a state declines, as was the case in Rome. The Romans had previously used volunteer forces, but as their state declined economically, serfdom was actually reinstated in many areas, and this practice became dangerous.

**It could be argued here that this doesn’t really deal with the political makeup of the military, but more the tactical composition. However, this trend has proven unique in its effects on military culture and has had political implications (mainly in regards to recruiting) and was thus seemed significant enough to include in this essay.

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Battle of Strasbourg, 357

Jonathan Webb — Mon, 07 Mar 2011 01:37:45 +0000

Julian the Apostate versus Chnodomar: A Roman army under Julian awaits an attack from an Alamanni army under Chnodomar. Julian boasts superior cavalry but Chnodomar believes his tactics can neutralize them. How will Julian adapt to these and other Alamanni surprises? Also known as the Battle of Argentoratum. Click on images below to view PowerPoint presentation. | Legend |

This battle is often classified as one of those classic battles between Roman “civilization” and barbarian “hordes” but this language subjectively labels entire cultures. Roman organization is consistently touted as superior to their Gallic and Germanic counterparts. Historiographically, the Romans are typically heavily outnumbered but prevail due to their superior organization; the barbarians appear as violent brutes who charge mindlessly but furiously. It is ironic that Roman accounts show absurd numbers of barbarians which would imply the Roman logistical organization is inferior. It was also the Romans who descended into civil war after “pacifying” west of the Rhine River and clever Alamanni tactics nearly overcame the Romans in this battle.

Chnodomar likely did not fight dismounted as some accounts would suggest; Delbrück points out how such a heavy-set man would not have been able to disengage from the battle and reach his horse to flee as primary sources insist he did (translated 1980: 267n). Regardless, he fought in the frontline as did other kings and nobles, which prevented any real management of the battle to react to events as they unfolded. Julian directed the battle from the center to the rear and was more able to respond to the defeat of the Roman cavalry on the right and the infantry at the center. On the Roman left, Severus effectively carried out his orders to protect the army’s left flank.

It is a great shame that I did not discover Delbrück’s four-volume History of the Art of War until now. While his German bias is evident, he is succinctly critical of history and asks questions that must be asked. Delbrück pays close attention to details of battles, destabilizing our current perception of battles. For Strasbourg, Delbrück finds great fault with the idea that Julian was able to prevent his cavalry from fleeing altogether by his personal intervention:

Such an act by a commander is very often found in military history but the larger the armies involved, the more certain it is that the reports are false . . . Troops which are already in flight and are sorely pressed by the enemy can no longer be stopped with mere words, least of all cavalry . . . In the “Military Letters” of Prince Kraft Hohenloe (1:78), we can read a critical description of how powerless a commander is to stop a cavalry unit overcome by panic, even if no real enemy is in pursuit. (1980: 264). He continues that stories of a commander miraculously rallying a unit only really occur when fresh units come into play; at Strasbourg, Roman infantry reserves entered the fray to engage the Alamanni cavalry. In the animation, only part of the cavalry remains near the battlefield and re-engages only when the battle is won, consistent with Ammianus’ vague description of the Roman cavalry’s return (Delbrück, 1980: 264).

Numbers as always are controversial and subject to debate. Elton (1996: 255) and Head (1976: 59) merely repeat the initial estimates of a vast Alamanni army of 35,000; Warry (1980: 206) and Goldsworthy (2000: 178) acknowledge this number is speculative; two authors are explicitly critical and offer their own estimates. Delbrück estimates only 6-10,000 Alamanni soldiers (1980: 267-8n) while Drinkwater estimates 15,000 based on a core of 9,000, levy of 4,000 and allies of 2,000 (2007: 239). The latter estimate is more recent, its author written more specifically on this time period and region, and more consistent with the typically meticulous Roman body count of 6-8,000 Alamanni.

Some maps of this battle depicted the Alamanni occupying slightly higher ground while others depicted the Roman occupying this terrain. For the animation, I have simply treated the battle as relatively flat, maybe with some gentle changes in terrain which would explain such contradictory illustrations. Regardless of which side held this terrain, it does not appear to have significantly affected the battle.

I only discovered this battle while playing Ancient Battles Deluxe, which is a solid board game with an extremely flexible battle engine from Victory Point Games. It is available for purchase as a board game and on Vassal, free software which creates an online method of playing board games, provided you know the rules. I must give a shout-out to another great community, DBA Online, for their adaptation of miniature war-gaming for online play. They also feature images for every historical army up until the medieval ages, which really helps me out when I am trying to depict what type of units comprise each army.

- Jonathan Webb

Works Consulted

Delbrück, Hans. History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History: The Germans Vol. 1. Translated by Walter J. Renfroe Jr. Westport: Greenwood, 1980.

Drinkwater, J.F. The Alamanni and Rome 213-496. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Dupuy, Trevor N. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 BC to the Present, Fourth Edition. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.

Elton, Hugh. Warfare in Roman Europe AD 350-425. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Goldsworthy, Adrian. Roman Warfare. New York: Cassell, 2000.

Head, Constance. The Emperor Julian. Boston: Twayne, 1976.

Warry, John. Warfare in the Classical World. London: Salamander, 1980.

Images

Alamannic cavalry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_74_figure_1.htm

Alamannic infantry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_74_figure_1.htm

Julian the Apostate: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_the_Apostate

Roman cavalry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_77a_figure_1.htm

Roman infantry: http://www.dbaol.com/armies/army_77a_figure_1.htm

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