While this battle did not mark the decline of the Ottoman Empire – it remained a threat to Europe for centuries after – the battle was a sign of things to come. The superior Holy League technology, the galeasse, played an important role in this battle. Europe of course modernized more rapidly than the Ottoman Empire which had significant implications for warfare among the two regions.

 

Technological innovations should not be overlooked in explaining the result of this battle. The beaks of Holy League galleys were removed for the battle so that bow cannons were more effective. This small but significant innovation along with the galeasse resulted in sinking or damaging possibly one-third of Ottoman ships (Crowley, 265). When the two battle lines collided, the Ottoman side was greatly depleted. The vital tactical factor in this battle was the reserves. While Müezzinzade Pasha’s reserve was deployed right beyond the center and pre-committed to fighting there, Juan’s reserve was under separate command: Bazan was given free reign to intervene anywhere he saw fit. During the battle, Bazan’s timely reinforcements contributed on all sectors.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Today this is perhaps the most chilling battle to recall. This battle resulted in the supremacy of Hitler’s Nazi regime in Europe and allowed for future invasions. In hindsight, it is common knowledge that Hitler was vanquished in the end after significant loss of life but in 1940 this did not seem imminent. The fall of France left Britain as the sole opposition to Nazi aggression with little of hope of victory. It is impossible to comprehend the shock and fear those opposed to Hitler felt in 1940 when France – always a check to Germany’s power – collapsed in a matter of weeks.

 

There are a great number of explanations for France’s defeat and Germany’s victory. Disparities in organization, spirit, mindset, tactical doctrine, technology and mobilization are valid but only explain the underlying factors in the result. The actual plans and deployments of forces are still of utmost importance in explaining how Germany defeated France so decisively. The clearest example of poor allocation of units is at the Maginot Line. On this front, 14 German divisions tied down 45 French divisions. The Maginot Line was a significant defensive line and theoretically should not need such superiority in numbers to be effective. This left 121 German divisions to face 114 French and allied divisions, a completely unnecessary scenario.

 

 

 

 

 

This battle ended the Second Punic War after sixteen grueling years. Rome, the entity Hannibal sought to destroy, may have actually become stronger in order to overcome his vicious threat to its existence.

 

This battle features two of the most talented, evenly matched commanders in history. Hannibal relied too heavily on the initial war elephant charge to disrupt Scipio’s formation, a rare weakness in creativity on Hannibal’s part. Scipio’s victory is strangely reminiscent of Hannibal’s victory at Cannae, which Scipio among few others escaped from. In this battle, Hannibal was simply defeated by an arguably superior commander who anticipated his maneuvers.

 

 

Belisarius versus Firuz: A Byzantine army under Belisarius chooses to fight a Sassanid army under Firuz outside the walls of a fortress rather than from within. Will Belisarius’ defensive position hold out against Firuz’ attacks? Also known as the Battle of Dara. Click on the image below to view.

 

 

The glory of this battle was overshadowed by Belisarius’ defeat at Callinicum in 531. While a loss at this battle would have hurt Byzantium, the battle stands out for its tactical intrigue and little more.

 

This battle illustrates the successful transition from defensive to offensive maneuver. Napoleon stated “The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive, followed by a rapid and audacious attack.” While Belisarius achieved the former, his attack was hardly audacious and the Sassanid army was repelled and not destroyed.

 

 

This is another battle I have animated from Goodenough’s Tactical Genius in Battle. Details regarding this battle vary. Sources disagree on the exact shape of the Byzantine ditch and the relative timing of the two Sassanid cavalry attacks.

 

Bayezid I versus Tamerlane: An exhausted Ottoman army under Bayezid is forced to attack a Timurid army under Tamerlane before it perishes from thirst. Can Bayezid use the traditionally defensive Ottoman army to not only defeat the great Tamerlane but quickly? Click on the images below to view.

 

 

This battle was fought between two bitter rivals. Bayezid and Tamerlane were known to write each other crude, insulting letters to each other for years leading up the battle. Any sort of victory therefore meant infinitely more to the victor than typical battles. That Tamerlane won such a battle in decisive fashion is a testament to his abilities as a commander

 

This battle was decided more by the strategic maneuvering than the tactical engagements. Tamerlane’s engineering feat of diverting the Cubuk Creek was timed perfectly so that Bayezid raised no suspicions until his water sources suddenly disappeared. The fact that the Ottomans were exhausted and thirsty increased the Timurid chances of victory but it should be remembered that the battle still had to be won by tactical engagement. The Ottoman attacks on the Timurid wings still had to be repelled and the Janissaries still had to be overcome. Pavio Giovio stated in the sixteenth century issued a warning that the Ottomans always won if attacked and always lost if forced to attack themselves. While no modern survey has been undertaken to confirm this, Ankara certainly supports this thesis.

 

This is yet another battle where determining the strength of each side was the greatest challenge. Sources even disagree in which side was superior in numbers. As usual, I decided which numbers were most credible based on what happened in the battle, not by the authors’ wide-ranging estimates. The Ottomans advanced in a crescent formation, a huge indication that their front extended beyond the Timurid front. The Ottomans attacked, suggesting numerical superiority but not in the context of running out of water. What suggests numerical superiority is that Bayezid waited until 10am to launch the attack, indication of a confident attacking force, not a completely desperate attempt to reach water.

I am particularly proud of the final product because of the scanty accounts of the battle are and scarcity of related maps. The deployment I have shown reflects accounts’ descriptions but is also based on typical deployments of Ottoman and Timurid armies during the time period.

 

 

 

Unfortunately, the success at Dresden was almost immediately negated by the disaster at Kulm. Bonaparte once said that “A man has his day in war as in other things; I myself shall be good for it another six years, after which even I shall have to stop”. He stated this in 1805, which means the triumph at Dresden came two years after he claimed he would have to stop. Whether Bonaparte was better or worse as a commander as time went on and when his true prime was is still hotly debated.

 

It is impossible to evaluate Bonaparte’s performance in this battle because it was not won by his tactical ability. Granted, his maneuvers in this battle were solid; he strengthened the wings and pounced on the weaker Allied wings while depending on his entrenched but outnumbered center to survive. The Allied left was crushed while the right held on to a single town which Bonaparte had not determined how he would capture yet. However, his mere presence is responsible for inspiring the French soldiers and intimidating the Allies into an unexpected withdrawal despite numerical superiority and contested strong points. Assuming Bonaparte was correct and that he was well past his prime by Dresden, his maneuvers of previous campaigns and wars proved more than a substitute in this particular battle.

 

 

As I have already made clear, Bonaparte’s battles and campaigns are a treat to animate. Another reason I am always eager to animate his engagements is the wealth of accurate, specific information found in West Point’s Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars. Before I began animating this battle, I received feedback pointing out that I could better detail the landscape of the animations. Looking back at some previous animations, I noticed the landscapes of some animations are quite dull while others are quite elaborate. I decided that I would put a better effort into this aspect to make the animations more visually appealing. I hope Dresden was a good first step towards this improvement.

 

 

 

This is one of Bonaparte’s most important campaigns. Without this nearly bloodless capture of the entire Austrian army, Bonaparte would have never been able to fight Austerlitz on the terms that allowed him to win a glorious victory, one of the most decisive victories of the Napoleonic Wars.

 

Bonaparte misdirected Mack’s attention by playing on his expectations of a French invasion through the Black Forest. Even so, only the speed and direction of Bonaparte’s marshals ensured that such a large Austrian force was captured at almost no cost.

 

 

 

 

 

This is yet another important stepping stone to Muslim conquest of the Middle East, each one more remarkable than the last.

 

This battle is touted as the East’s answer to Cannae, both of which involve commanders using a double envelopment maneuver to annihilate a larger army. It is said that Khalid had never heard of Hannibal and his execution of the double envelopment maneuver is certainly unique to Hannibal’s at Cannae.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Desperate, fearful men fought on both sides in this forgotten struggle for Eastern Europe. The prospect of what would happen if either side suffered defeat was well-known in all ranks.

 

Tactically, the battle seems simple: Tukhacevsky and Yegorov did not cooperate and therefore a wide – literal – rift developed between their two army groups which Pilsudski exploited to roll up the Soviet line from the south. Logistically, the battle is very complicated; Pilsudski was able to organize his logistics satisfactorily enough to actually launch his decisive offensive while Tukhachevsky was not. Western historians cringe at the thought of what would have happened had the Soviet horde been a more organized horde and launched its decisive offensive before Pilsudski.

 

 

The battle was relatively easy to animate compared with other massive, modern battles such as Mukden. As is typically the case, I spent more time determining the strength and casualties of each side. One issue was the fact that my animation featured only the northern half of a wider strategic campaign and so I was forced to do my own arithmetic. Fuller’s Decisive Battles of the Western World was specific as to the size of formations so I only had to subtract the formations not shown in the animation. I was therefore confronted with a casualty figure that exceeded the total number of Soviet soldiers involved. Szymczak put forward the most reasonable casualty figures in “Polish Soviet War: Battle of Warsaw” but these include the wider Warsaw campaign which I was not animating. Nonetheless, I converted these numbers to a percentage and arrived at the figures you see in the animation. Are they exact? Absolutely not. However, they serve their purpose.

 

 

 

 

The Burma Campaign itself is often seen as comparatively unimportant even though more Japanese were defeated by Slim than any other commander. Indirectly though, the Burma Campaign was vital; had Slim failed to reopen the Burma Road, the Japanese Ichi-Go Offensive to knock China out of the war may have succeeded. This would have made the Pacific War much more costly and difficult, considering that the three million Japanese troops committed in China could have been diverted.

 

Slim won this battle the way the Allies won the war: he lured Mutaguchi into a battle of attrition in which an overwhelming superiority of material and logistics prevailed. Mutaguchi’s plan was rigid and inflexible which meant the British supply base at Dimapur was not taken despite being undefended. Slim had a plan but adjustments were made during the battle to overcome new obstacles such as the unexpected attack against Kohima.