Francesca II Gonzaga versus Charles VIII: A League army under Gonzaga seeks to destroy a French army marching home under Charles, but the Taro River  separates them. Will Gonzaga’s audacious attack plan overcome not only the terrain but one of the most reputable armies in all of Europe?

 

 

This battle is classified as a draw and had little eventual consequence but did create a situation in which decisive results and consequences were possible. In a strategic sense, the French were able to achieve their objective of continuing on to France as a result of their tactical victory over League forces on every front. However, League cavalry was able to loot the French baggage train, claiming 180,000 gold ducats as well as forcing most French soldiers to go without tents, dry clothes and food for the night (Nicolle, 1996: 73). Aside from sowing tensions among the League commanders, the League army may have been in a better state compared to the French after the battle, suffering proportionately fewer casualties and possessing more fresh soldiers. Of course, neither army followed up the battle with any bold action, and thus the battle is remembered as an indecisive draw.

 

Gonzaga’s plan of attack appeared faultless but obviously had significant problems. Contradictorily, the League’s goal was the enemy’s total destruction and yet over a quarter of its soldiers guarded the camp. Taylor explains that the battle is notable for the “bad choice of ground by the [League], and for the over-elaboration of their tactical scheme. Lack of determination prevented tem from driving their attacks home or from making use of their reserves, while indiscipline ruined the most promising feature of the plan – the diversion of the [light cavalry]” (1973: 115). The League plan correctly identified the French center and Charles as the most promising target and allotted 10,000 men in the battlegroups of Gonzaga, Garlino, Fortebraccio and Montefeltro to defeat the 3,900 men of the French center and rearguard. However, the above factors eroded the mass and energy of the main thrust: “Thus, at the moment of confrontation, Gonzaga and Fortebraccio were left without support, and the French probably outnumbered them” (Santosuosso, 1994: 242).

 

Following the failure of the League plan, League commanders showed some initiative in securing the fords Gonzaga and Fortebraccio’s battlegroups used to retreat as well as firing off artillery to deter any French counterattack.